Re: Are you changing your behavior in response to current events?
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Originally Posted by Eric_L
I've not denied derivatives were problematic. I'm simply suggesting that they would not have become such a problem had the mortgages been underwritten with more consideration to the borrower's suitability. The derivatives blew up because the mortgages blew up.
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I agree with all that, as far as it goes. Where we disagree, I suspect is this: I don't think the mortgages blowing up (specifically, the subprime market, but we don't have to limit it to the subprime market) would have been sufficient to take down major financial institutions like Bear Stearns or Lehman Brothers
if they were just mortgages. It's because the derivatives blew up in a chain reaction that those institutions failed.
Let me try it this way: A bank holds a $500,000 mortgage on a property, and the mortgage goes into default. What does the bank have on its balance sheet? Well, presumably you can get some idea by appraising the property and projecting what the bank will realize in a foreclosure sale. So the bank can restate its financials, and anyone looking at those financials can be fairly confident that they represent the bank's true condition.
Now, suppose instead that it's not a bank but an investment banking house. We'll call it Grin and Bear It, or "GBI" for short. GBI doesn't issue mortgages or hold foreclosure rights. Instead, it holds a bunch of paper known as collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs) with face values assigned to them by another investment banking house that issued the paper based on a pool of mortgages. Let's take one piece of paper with a face value of $500,000 that represents "tranche 3" (whatever that is) of this pool of mortgages, which is supposed to pay 7% interest per annum.
Now suppose one day the interest payments either stop completely or are less than they're supposed to be, because of defaulting mortgages. This should give GBI some sort of recourse. For simplicity's sake, let's say it gives GBI the right to call the note. But the outfit that issued the note can't pay the face value. Why? Because everyone holding those notes is clamoring to be paid at the same time, and the issuer doesn't have enough available cash to pay it, having never expected such a scenario to occur because the computer geeks who designed these things and ran the models assured everyone that such a thing could never, ever happen.
So now GBI has this asset on its books with a face value of $500,000, but what's it really worth? GBI has no clue. You can't sell it to anyone. You can't measure it against a piece of property that can be appraised. The most you can measure it against is the right to maybe recover, years down the line, in a litigation or bankruptcy; and we all know how much
that's worth.
All of sudden, GBI's $500,000 asset is worth about zero. Sure, GBI could put a different value on it, but no one will believe it.
Multiply that (admittedly oversimplified) scenario by several million, and that's how these institutions go from having billions to having nothing almost overnight. And it's why they stop lending to each other, and suddenly there's a credit freeze. Mortgage defaults lit the fuse, but derivatives were the explosive.
M.