BD+ Advanced Countermeasure: How Blu-Ray can hose your player

Pete T C · 08-12-2006, 11:41 AM

http://www.avsforum.com/avs-vb/showt...&&#post8193766

Quote:

Originally Posted by Sony BD+ Security Presentation

From p. 25 of the April 11, 2006 BDA "Overview of BD-ROM Security" internal presentation, delivered at a BDA conference, concerning the "3 phases of BD+ deployment":

Advanced Countermeasure (when basic countermeasure code does not work)

BD+ includes the ability to load native code (code that runs directly on the player’s host process). It is allowed to deploy it only after countermeasure code cannot address the hack.

So, yes, Parsons, chat up the FUT and Basic Countermeasure components of BD+ all you want. Just don't tell us what really happens when a Basic Countermeasure spawned from a BDA-sanctioned Hack Study fails to achieve its goal. The arrogance of this man never ceases to astound me.

EDIT: Just so we're all on the same page here, there is a distinction between co-called BD+ Content Code (which runs in the BD+ VM) and native code. It's a distinction that I first failed to recognize, as I didn't read the BDA documentation very carefully, and was willing to believe the smoke and mirrors. As the BDA will gleefully tell everyone who will listen, "BD+ Content Code works only while Disc with the code is loaded. After its ejection, Player to return to its state before the code is loaded." Alas, Advanced Countermasures don't have anything to do with BD+ Content Code.

In other words, Sony Rootkit Part 2. Basically if a Blu-Ray disc detects something it doesn't like and can't get rid of it, it can run native code of its choosing (a la rootkit) on your machine and possibly even permanently disable it. Something good to know if you are on the fence between the two formats - note that HD DVD does not include this "feature."

Bob_L · 08-12-2006, 12:26 PM

Hmmm.

Is it just me or--between this and the draconian copy protection scheme--is the Blu-Ray starting to take on a new identity as the next generation Divx DVD?

EDIT:

Later in this thread, more of an interview with Parsons is quoted that makes this sound NOT QUITE so threatening:

Quote:

CEN: It's not the player that's disabled, right? It's just that disc?

Parsons: It's just the playback of the disc. There would be absolutely no change or modification made to a consumer's property. That belongs to the consumer. You can't just go in and start messing around with their players. No one has any intention of doing that. It's just something that when you put the disc in, BD Plus suspends itself up in a virtual machine inside the player, much like Java does. ... If it is operating, it is doing that just for that moment, but when you eject the disc, any trace of BD Plus immediately evaporates from the player.

CEN: So that's not a root-kit, per se, is it?

Parsons: No, not at all. Nothing is ever installed or put into a player with any persistence whatsoever. It's completely momentary. It's just at that moment, playing that title, and that's the only time it's doing anything. And, it's only looking for hacks that may exist. If they're found, then it says, "OK, I don't want you to play this title." That's it.

Even so, reading further in the thread, it becomes apparent that native code CAN be run on the BD players which may have the potential to disable the player. If a company tried to do this, there would be a widespread groaning and gnashing of teeth. However, that wouldn't stop someone else from exploiting this. What hacker wouldn't like to be the one who wrote the virus that hosed the world's BD players?

Not a nice thought. We'll just have to see how this plays out.

This next gen DVD format war is a befuddling business, isn't it?

Ryan-G · 08-13-2006, 04:16 AM

Quote:

It's just something that when you put the disc in, BD Plus suspends itself up in a virtual machine inside the player, much like Java does. ... If it is operating, it is doing that just for that moment, but when you eject the disc, any trace of BD Plus immediately evaporates from the player.

I'm having a problem here with this.

Now standalone players should be fine. But PC based drives have an issue, Java is not a terribly difficult language as far as programming languages go. I can easily see a method for PC drives to be infected, and disabled, in short order. Especially since Starforce showed it's ability to mess with drives.

If the whole thing were running on the PC's OS, I'd be ok with it. But since it's a drive with a functional processor on it, this could cause alot of trouble.

But, as bad as that is, it's a great deal worse for PS3. A hacker could easily off millions of PS3's with a virus.

I dunno though, I mean GPU's are functional processors and nothing's ever happened to them, maybe it's not as bad as I'm thinking...

Tony Stark · 08-13-2006, 07:29 AM

I am trying to understand why this is a bad thin. So why is it?

Basically, if you don't mess with the firmware the player will operate fine. If you purchase legit discs the machine will work with no problems.

Say a virus is loaded on a game/movie at the manufacture and got past qualit control. Millions of discs of that game wont work, but the player will still play other media. A recall or exchange of the faulty disc would happen and things will soon be settled. I know I have had about a dozen or so bad DVD's over the year bought new that wouldnt play.

So again, why is this a bad thing (a company making sure that its hardware hasnt been tampered with)?

Ricardo C · 08-13-2006, 08:12 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Tony Stark

I am trying to understand why this is a bad thin. So why is it?

Basically, if you don't mess with the firmware the player will operate fine. If you purchase legit discs the machine will work with no problems.

Say a virus is loaded on a game/movie at the manufacture and got past qualit control. Millions of discs of that game wont work, but the player will still play other media. A recall or exchange of the faulty disc would happen and things will soon be settled. I know I have had about a dozen or so bad DVD's over the year bought new that wouldnt play.

So again, why is this a bad thing (a company making sure that its hardware hasnt been tampered with)?

After the rootkit fiasco, I don't see how Sony running unspecified "security" code on any type of hardware sounds like a good idea. They don't get the benefit of the doubt anymore from me.

**HTF Ads**

Rob_Walton · 08-13-2006, 09:35 AM

Was BD+ developed by Sony?

Rachael B · 08-13-2006, 10:32 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Tony Stark

I am trying to understand why this is a bad thin. So why is it?

Basically, if you don't mess with the firmware the player will operate fine. If you purchase legit discs the machine will work with no problems.

BD+ may not always function properly. It could be the cause of malfunctions. Will a defective disc set it off? Extra cogs in a machine are usually a bad idea. One of Murphy's Laws is, "anything that can can go wrong, will go wrong".

Ricardo C · 08-13-2006, 10:38 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Rob_Walton

Was BD+ developed by Sony?

I don't know, and I don't care. Sony is ultimately in charge.

Neither piece of software involved in the rootkit debacle was developed by Sony, but it was them that chose to use it and release it. So whether BD+ was developed in-house or by a third party, means nothing in terms of how uneasy I feel about it. It's Sony calling the shots.

Rob_Walton · 08-13-2006, 04:07 PM

The BDA is more than Sony. Frankly I'm starting to think Panasonic weild more power in this group than the object of your ire. As to root kits I have no love for them, regardless of whether it's Sony's CDs or Microsoft's recent software update version. They all suck.